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Abstract 
In a classic experiment, Srull and Wyer (1979) showed that when participants were 
incidentally exposed to a number of words related to a trait (e.g., hostility), their 
subsequent judgments of a target person were influenced by these primes. Recent work in 
social cognition, however, has shown that the use of accessible information can often be 
affected by cues to validity (e.g., Loersch & Payne, 2009).  In the current research, we 
explored whether the attributional cue of trustworthiness could affect the impact of trait 
primes.  The design of the study was a 2 (prime: hostile vs. kind) x 2 (source: trustworthy 
vs. untrustworthy). To test the hypothesis, participants read a paragraph about a fictional 
person written by either a trustworthy or untrustworthy source. While reading this 
information, participants were subliminally primed with one of two trait concepts. Then, 
participants made judgments about the fictional person’s traits. The results showed that 
trait priming interacted with source trust to affect participants’ subsequent judgments.  
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Trustworthiness is a characteristic that people utilize to make everyday decisions 
and judgments. For instance, people often will give information over the Internet to 
companies that they trust (e.g., Amazon, Ebay, and various banks), but do not do so for 
unknown Internet companies. This is exemplified by the research of Park, Lee, and 
Widdows (2004), who found that trust in an online seller positively influenced a buyer’s 
intention to bid. Similarly, Hoffman, Thomas, & Marcos (1998) found that people’s 
purchasing behavior towards Internet companies was often limited by their lack of trust 
in the companies ability to ensure consumer information privacy. Finally, a great deal of 
research within the domain of attitudes has found that trust in a persuasive message’s 
source is a critical determinant of information processing and message efficacy (e.g., 
(e.g., Benoit & Kennedy, 1998; Priester & Petty, 1995; Tormala & Clarkson, 2008). In 
the current research we will investigate the influence of source trustworthiness in yet 
another domain, examining whether this variable can affect the impact of subliminally 
primed information on participants’ later judgments of another person.   
Many studies have examined the effects of priming on attitudes and judgments 
(see Higgins, 1996) and many studies have also examined factors that determine whether 
or not activated mental contents are seen as valid (e.g., see Briñol & Petty, 2009).  The 
current thesis examines both phenomena in tandem. When participants are primed with a 
trait, the accessibility of this trait concept is increased and often has an impact on 
judgments of ambiguous targets. For instance, in one study by Srull and Wyer (1979), 
participants were primed with the trait of kindness prior to reading a short description of 
events that occurred during a target person’s (i.e., Donald’s) day. This prime caused 
participants to judge Donald as a kinder person than individuals in a control condition. In 
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a second study, the generality of this effect was demonstrated by priming participants 
with the trait of hostility instead.  
Although these effects are often assumed to be due to relatively effortless and 
automatic changes in person perception (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982), recent research 
has suggested that such priming may instead be dependent on an unconscious 
attributional inference process (Loersch & Payne, 2009).  According to the attributional 
model of priming, these effects begin with simple construct accessibility created by a 
prime. This basic accessibility then biases thought, perception, and memory, increasing 
the likelihood that one has prime-relevant cognitions in mind. When these thoughts are 
relevant to a target of judgment (e.g., Donald, as in Srull & Wyer, 1979), then they can be 
used as evidence for interpreting the target.  And, consistent with the idea that prime-
relevant thoughts are an important determinant of priming effects, individuals who 
spontaneously engage in high levels of thought are also more likely to show an impact of 
subtle primes on judgment than are those who do not spontaneously engage in much 
thinking (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008).   
Critically, research on the self-validation hypothesis (Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 
2002) has shown that generating thoughts is not sufficient for them to impact judgments.  
Rather, people must also trust or have confidence in the validity of their thoughts.  
Numerous studies have now shown that confidence or trust in activated mental contents 
(e.g., thoughts) is an important determinant of their use in judgments.  For example, in 
one study (Petty et al., 2002), when students were told that their thoughts were shared 
with many fellow students, their thoughts were held with more confidence and had a 
greater impact on attitudes than when the students were told that their thoughts were not 
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shared with their fellow students.  In prior research, numerous manipulations (e.g., 
power, positive mood, head nodding, etc.) have affected thought confidence and thus the 
use of one’s thoughts in judgments (see Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a review).  With respect 
to priming, then, because one’s primed thoughts are simply used as evidence in an 
attributional inference process, they presumably will only be used to the extent that 
people trust their thoughts and view them as a valid source of information.   
If this attributional analysis of priming is correct, then the classic trait priming 
effects documented by Srull and Wyer (1979) could also be affected by any variables that 
affect the perceived validity of accessible information.  The purpose of the current work 
is to explore the influence of one particular cue of validity, source trustworthiness, 
though any variable that has been shown to affect thought confidence would presumably 
work as well. Within research on persuasion, source trustworthiness has been shown to 
lead participants to trust message content.  When participants are unmotivated to think 
carefully about message arguments, they often use simple cues to tell them whether or 
not to trust the message (Petty et al., 1981).  More relevant to the current research, cues 
such as credibility have also been shown to lead people to trust the thoughts they generate 
in response to a persuasive message (e.g., Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006, 2007).  The 
logic is that if people can trust the message, they can also trust their thoughts to the 
message. 
The Current Research  
In order to examine the influence of confidence on trait priming, I conducted an 
experiment in which a hypothetical individual (i.e., the source) provides some 
information about another target person (i.e., Donald).  Depending upon the condition, 
Source trust and priming 6 
the source was either labeled in a manner that past research has shown operates as a cue 
of validity (e.g., trustworthy) or in a manner that operates as a cue of invalidity (e.g., 
untrustworthy).  During the presentation of the information about the target, participants 
were also subliminally primed with a trait concept.  After receiving these two types of 
information, participants’ impressions of the target were assessed.  In line with the 
predictions outlined earlier, we expected the primed trait to color participants judgments 
of the target, but only when the source of this information was trustworthy.  If the source 
was untrustworthy, participants should not believe the information provided by this 
source (even though it is presented to them subliminally) and the primes should have no 
effect because people would not be relying on their thoughts.  
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 156 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at 
Ohio State University. These participants earned class credit for their participation. At the 
conclusion of the experiment, participants were asked to rate how seriously they took the 
experiment on a scale from 0 (not at all serious) to 4 (very serious). One participant was 
eliminated for answering with a 0 (not at all serious). 
Procedure 
The experiment utilized a full factorial 2 (trait prime: hostility vs. kindness) X 2 
(source: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) between-subjects design. The experiment was 
presented on a computer using the Medialab and DirectRT experimental software 
package (Jarvis, 2006). To test our hypotheses, participants read a paragraph about a 
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fictional person, which was provided by either a trustworthy or untrustworthy source. 
Those participants in the trustworthy source condition were informed that: 
 “The individual who told us the following story had known Donald for 3 years 
and was described as “a very good friend” by Donald.  Two other common 
friends and/or acquaintances of Donald and this individual commented that the 
story teller was very reliable and confirmed that the events described in this 
person's story had, in fact, occurred.   One of these individuals also commented 
that the events “were very characteristic” of Donald's personality.”   
Participants who learned that this individual was an untrustworthy source, on the 
other hand, were told that:  
The individual who told us the following story had known Donald 3 weeks and 
was described as “a recently hired coworker” by Donald.  Two other common 
friends and/or acquaintances of Donald and this individual commented that the 
story teller was prone to exaggeration and they felt some of the events described 
in this story had NOT, in fact, occurred.  One of these individuals also 
commented that the events “were very uncharacteristic” of Donald's personality. 
After receiving these instructions, participants read about a day in Donald’s life 
(taken from Srull & Wyer, 1979, Study 1).  The text presented was as follows: 
I ran into Donald the other day, and I decided to go over and visit him, since by 
coincidence we had the same day off.  Soon after I arrived, a salesman knocked at 
the door, but Donald refused to let him enter.  He also told me that he was 
refusing to pay his rent until the landlord repaints his apartment.  We talked for a 
while, had lunch, and then went out for a ride.  We used my car, since Donald's 
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car had broken down that morning, and he told the garage mechanic that he would 
have to go somewhere else if he couldn't fix his car that same day.  We went to 
the park for about an hour and then stopped at a hardware store.  I was sort of 
preoccupied, but Donald bought some small gadget, and then I heard him demand 
his money back from the sales clerk.  I couldn't find what I was looking for, so we 
left and walked a few blocks to another store. The Red Cross had set up a stand by 
the door and asked us to donate blood.  Donald lied by saying he had diabetes and 
therefore could not give blood.  It's funny that I hadn't noticed it before, but when 
we got to the store, we found that it had gone out of business.  It was getting kind 
of late, so I took Donald to pick up his car and we agreed to meet again as soon as 
possible.  
This information was presented one word at a time with each additional word 
appended to the preceding text every 500 ms. The screen was cleared after each 
individual sentence of the paragraph.  While reading this information, participants were 
also subliminally primed with the trait concepts of either kindness or hostility. These 
primes were displayed on the screen for 10 ms followed by a 13 ms mask of random 
letter strings (e.g. “qwekzeer”).  A prime was presented after every word of the paragraph 
about Donald except the last word of the sentence, resulting in 235 total priming trials.  
This priming procedure has been used successfully in past work to influence attitudes 
towards a target individual (Loersch, McCaslin, & Petty, 2009). The words used to prime 
the trait concept hostile were: aggressive, angry, bitter, cold, combative, hateful, hostile, 
irritable, mean, and nasty. The trait concept of kindness was primed using the words: 
calm, considerate, gentle, kind, loving, nice, peaceful, sweet, thoughtful, and warm.   
Source trust and priming 9 
After this information had been presented, participants were asked to list their 
thoughts about Donald and his personality. Participants then went back and rated each 
thought individually on the degree to which it was positive, negative, or neutral in regards 
to Donald. Positive thoughts were given a score of 1, negative thoughts were given a 
score of -1, and neutral thoughts received a score of 0. Participants then rated their 
confidence in each of these thoughts, rating the extent to which they believe it was truly 
descriptive of their thoughts and feelings about Donald.  These ratings were made on a 9-
point scale with anchors at 0 – not at all to 8 – extremely.  
Participants then made judgments on how kind, caring, and agreeable they found 
Donald. These ratings were on a 9-point scale with anchors at 0 – not at all to 8- 
extremely for ratings of kindness, and -4 – uncaring/disagreeable to +4 – 
caring/agreeable for ratings of caring and agreeableness. 
Results 
 All dependent measures were submitted to separate 2 (prime: hostility vs. 
kindness) X 2 (message source: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) ANOVAs.  
Thought Generation 
As expected, the trait primes had a marginally significant effect on the thoughts 
generated about Donald, F(1,151) = 3.409, p  = .067.  Opposite to my predictions, 
however, the thoughts generated by those participants in the hostile priming condition 
were relatively more positive (M = -2.33, SD = 2.85) than the thoughts of those in the 
kind priming condition (M = -3.18, SD = 2.83). 
Confidence of Thoughts 
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As predicted, participants’ confidence was affected by the source of the message 
about Donald. Participants in the trustworthy source condition were significantly more 
confident in their overall impression of Donald (M = 5.95, SD = 1.90), than the 
untrustworthy source condition (M = 5.14, SD = 2.17), F(1,151) = 6.153, p = .014. The 
source of the message also had a marginally significant effect on the average confidence 
of participants’ generated thoughts, F(1, 151) = 3.629,  p = .059.  Those in the 
trustworthy condition tended to be more confident (M = 6.24, SD = 1.33) than those in 
the untrustworthy condition (M = 5.82, SD = 1.41). 
Trait Ratings of Donald 
 In contrast to our predictions, there was no effect of prime or message source on 
participants’ ratings of Donald’s kindness (all Fs < 1.06).  There was, however, a 
marginally significant interaction between prime and message source for ratings of 
Donald’s agreeableness, F(1,151) = 3.507, p = .063.  Participants in the untrustworthy 
source condition tended to assimilate to the trait primes, judging Donald as more 
agreeable after kindness priming (M = -1.48, SD = 1.34) than after hostility priming (M = 
-1.89, SD = 1.39), F(1,151) = 1.559, p = .214.  Participants in the trustworthy source 
condition, however, tended to contrast judgments away from the trait primes, judging 
Donald as less agreeable after kindness priming (M = -2.05, SD = 1.25) than after 
hostility priming (M = -1.58, SD = 1.86), F(1,151) = 1.955, p = .164. 
 There was also a significant interaction between prime and message source for 
ratings of Donald’s caring, F(1,151) = 4.486, p = .036.  Again, participants in the 
untrustworthy source condition tended to assimilate to the trait primes, judging Donald as 
more caring after kindness priming (M = -1.36, SD = 1.32) than after hostility priming (M 
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= -1.76, SD = 1.55), F(1,151) = 1.608, p = .207.  Participants in the trustworthy source 
condition, however, tended to contrast judgments away from the trait primes, judging 
Donald as less caring after kindness priming (M = -1.87, SD = 1.17) than after hostility 
priming (M = -1.32, SD = 1.53), F(1,151) = 2.970, p = .087. 
In order to provide a summary index representing participants’ general feelings 
towards Donald, participants’ ratings of Donald’s kindness, agreeableness, and caring 
were Z-transformed and averaged.  The two-way interaction between prime and message 
source was marginally significant for this measure, F(1,151) = 3.148, p = .078 (see 
Figure 1). Participants in the untrustworthy source condition tended to assimilate to the 
trait primes, judging Donald more positively after kindness priming (M = 0.18, SD = 
0.73) than after hostility priming (M = -0.07, SD = 0.87), F(1,151) = 1.90, p = .170. The 
trust condition participants tended to contrast judgments away from the trait primes, 
judging Donald with a more positively after hostility priming (M = 0.07, SD = 0.97) than 
after kindness priming (M = -0.14, SD = 0.64), F(1,151) = 1.29, p = .26. 
Discussion 
 Our study examined the role of source trustworthiness in determining whether 
information made accessible by a prime would impact subsequent judgments or not. As 
expected, the trait primes (hostility vs. kindness) had an effect on the thoughts the 
participants generated. Although, opposite to my hypothesis, participants primed with 
hostile traits listed more positive thoughts than those primed with kindness traits. 
Replicating past research, participants’ confidence was affected by the source 
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) of the message. In the trustworthy source condition, 
participants were more confident in their overall impressions of Donald than those in the 
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untrustworthy source condition. Additionally, the trustworthy source participants were 
more confident in each thought they generated about Donald than the untrustworthy 
source participants. 
It was hypothesized that participants in trustworthy condition would assimilate 
their judgments of Donald to the trait primes.  Primes should affect the information that 
one has in mind. When this information is associated with a trustworthy source, it should 
be trusted and should therefore impact judgments in an assimilative manner. When the 
information is associated with an untrustworthy source, it should be distrusted and should 
no longer be used to form judgments, causing the primes to have no effect on judgments. 
Opposite my predictions, however, it was actually the untrustworthy participants that 
assimilated to the primes. Among those in the untrustworthy source condition, 
participants judged Donald more positively after being primed with kindness than those 
who had been primed with hostility. The opposite held for participants in the trustworthy 
condition, who judged Donald more positively after being primed with hostility than 
whose had been primed with hostility.  
Critically, although these effects are opposite to those predicted, participants’ 
judgments do follow their generated thoughts when the message was delivered by a 
trustworthy source and are opposite to their thoughts when the message was delivered by 
an untrustworthy source. Thus, although the effects are opposite those originally 
predicted, this seems to be due to a contrast effect of priming on the thoughts participants 
generate about Donald. Since those in the positive (kind) prime condition generated less 
favorable thoughts than those in the negative (hostile) condition, if a trustworthy source 
led to increased reliance on thoughts compared to an untrustworthy source, the end result 
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would be less positive attitudes in the positive than negative priming condition especially 
when the source was trustworthy.  These are the results obtained.  In this sense, then, the 
actual impact of source trustworthiness on attitudes as a function of the thoughts induced 
by the primes was compatible with my hypotheses. 
Contrast Effect 
As I’ve alluded to, one aspect of these results that was unexpected was the fact 
that the subliminal primes produced a contrast effect on the thoughts that participants 
generated about Donald. That is, participants primed with kindness actually produced 
more negative thoughts than those primed with hostility. Although this was unpredicted, 
past research suggests one reason why we might have observed this effect. In particular, 
research shows that having many priming trails can make a prime blatant and cause 
participants’ judgments to contrast away from the primed construct. The more blatant the 
prime, the more people appear to correct for the prime’s presumed influence, often 
producing in a contrast effect (Wegener & Petty, 1997).  On the other hand, more subtle 
manipulations, such as when the number of priming trials is decreased, lead primes to 
produce judgmental assimilation (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Harcajo, & Srathman, 2008). 
Critically, in my study I primed participants after almost every word, which may 
have created a blatant priming induction even though each individual priming stimulus 
was subliminal. In particular, participants were primed after every word except the last 
word of each sentence. This means that participants received a prime about every half 
second, resulting in a total of 235 primes. While subliminal, receiving this many primes 
over a 2.5 minute task may have been too blatant of a priming induction. 
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As suggested by the work of Petty et al. (2008), reducing the number of primes 
might reduce the blatancy of this priming manipulation and produce results more in line 
with the original hypotheses. For instance, I might instead present a single prime every 
four words, leading participants to receive a prime about every 2 seconds. This would 
reduce the total number of primes from 235 to 62. This more subtle priming could have 
drastic effects on thought generation, perhaps making participants’ thoughts assimilate to 
the primed traits instead of producing the contrast observed in the current experiment. 
Implications 
Importantly, these findings have interesting implications for real world 
advertising. Some advertising ad campaigns have attempted to use subliminal primes to 
influence viewers. For example, an event known as the Rats ad controversy shows the 
implications that subliminal priming can have in political advertising (Egan, 2000). This 
controversy occurred before the 2000 presidential election when the Republican Party ran 
an ad against Al Gore that presented the word “rats” on the screen as the word 
“bureaucrats” appeared. Presumably, this prime was presented to give viewers a negative 
attitude towards Al Gore. The current study suggests that viewers’ level of trust for the 
Republican Party may have affected the efficacy of this technique. In particular, my 
research suggests that viewers’ attitude towards Al Gore could be differentially 
influenced by the prime depending on whether or not the viewer trusted the ad. 
Democrats would be more likely to distrust the ad as would people who generally distrust 
politicians and those who are wary of television advertisements. Republicans, however, 
are more likely to trust the ad.  Critically, according to my research, only those who trust 
the source of the ad would use the subliminal information to inform their opinions. 
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Perhaps this means that the ad is most likely to work for those for whom it is least 
important, people who already dislike Al Gore (i.e., Republicans). 
Conclusion 
In summary, the present research combines subliminal priming with source 
trustworthiness to investigate the possibility that cues of validity can influence priming 
effects. In the untrustworthy source condition, participants judged Donald more 
positively after being primed with kindness than those after being primed with hostility. 
The opposite occurred for participants in the trustworthy condition, who judged Donald 
more positively after being primed with hostility than after being primed with kindness. 
These findings demonstrate that the effect of the primes were different when participants 
trusted or distrusted the source of the message. One aspect of this research that was 
unexpected was that those participants primed with hostile traits overall listed more 
positive thoughts about Donald than those primed with kindness traits. One explanation 
for this contrast effect on the thoughts generated stems from the fact that the priming was 
very blatant. Future research should be conducted with less blatant primes to examine  
this idea. Furthermore, future research should also examine whether other validity cues 
that have been identified in the literature such as source expertise, or power, or positive 
affect can  have a similar impact on priming effects. Although additional research is 
needed, this study provides a new perspective on the importance that perceptions of 
validity as induced by source trustworthiness have in priming. 
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Figure 1: The effects of trustworthiness and primed trait on participants’ average trait 
ratings of Donald 
 
 
